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THE IMPORTANCE OF SCHOLARSHIP TO LAW 
SCHOOL EXCELLENCE 
William E. Nelson* 
 
As we have learned from Dan Coquillette,1 Bob Kaczorowski,2 and John 
Sexton,3 access to substantial funding is undoubtedly a prerequisite for a law 
school to enjoy excellence.  Funding, that is, is a necessary, but not sufficient 
condition for excellence.  Something else—intellectual vision—is also 
required. 
In the 1930s, Fordham University School of Law was, if not a peer, surely 
a rival of Columbia Law School.  Fordham then had a special intellectual 
mission of national political importance.4  By the 1950s, however, Fordham’s 
mission, as articulated in the 1930s, had become politically and intellectually 
irrelevant.  As a result, Fordham declined and became just an ordinary, good 
law school. 
In the 1950s, Harvard Law School was the preeminent law school in the 
United States.  Its faculty promoted an intellectual agenda that paralleled the 
judicial agenda of a majority of the justices of the Supreme Court of the 
United States.5  By the 1980s, however, both the Supreme Court’s and 
Harvard’s agendas had changed, thereby ending Harvard’s intellectual and 
institutional supremacy. 
In this Article, I examine the relationship between ideas and institutional 
excellence in legal education.  Although I differ with him in regard to some 
details, Bob Kaczorowski has discussed the importance of ideas in the history 
 
*  Edward Weinfeld Professor of Law, New York University School of Law.  The author is 
indebted to Robert Kaczorowski for his comments and to the Filomen D’Agostino and Max 
E. Greenberg Faculty Research Fund of New York University School of Law for research 
support.  This Article was prepared for the Symposium entitled Legal Education in Twentieth-
Century America, held at New York University’s Villa La Pietra conference center in 
Florence, Italy, on July 2–4, 2018.  For an overview of the Symposium, see Matthew Diller, 
Foreword:  Legal Education in Twentieth-Century America, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 859 (2018). 
 
 1. See Bruce A. Kimball & Daniel R. Coquillette, History and Harvard Law School, 87 
FORDHAM L. REV. 883 (2018). 
 2. See Robert J. Kaczorowski, Fordham University School of Law:  A Case Study of 
Legal Education in Twentieth-Century America, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 861 (2018). 
 3. See John Sexton, Subsidiarity and Federalism:  The Relationship Between Law 
Schools and Their Universities, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 911 (2018). 
 4. See infra notes 20–22 and accompanying text. 
 5. See infra notes 77–86 and accompanying text. 
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of Fordham Law School, and so I will use his excellent book6 to articulate a 
paradigm that explains how ideas relate to institutional development.  I will 
then use the paradigm to examine developments at Harvard Law School 
parallel to those that occurred earlier at Fordham.  I agree with John Sexton 
that a good law school must be concerned with the “ought” of the law as well 
as the “is.”7  But my paradigm goes beyond that and shows that a leading or 
outstanding law school must view the “ought” in the context of political and 
societal debates ongoing in the nation at the time. 
Fordham Law School may have been founded, at least in part, to enable 
Catholic students who could not attend the likes of Columbia, Harvard, and 
Yale to obtain a legal education.8  But its principal purpose appears to have 
been the propagation of a Roman Catholic conception of law.  For example, 
Father John Collins, who was Fordham University’s president at the time of 
the Law School’s founding, saw “professional schools” as “mediums . . . for 
the uplifting of mankind,” and he accordingly charged the new law school 
with preserving in students “a belief in higher things than those which can be 
seen with the eye and touched with the hand.”9  To achieve this end, Fordham 
required all students to take a course in legal ethics and a course in 
jurisprudence that contained a significant ethical component.10 
Joseph A. Warren, the Law School’s registrar, elaborated on this view of 
ethics.  According to Warren’s Catholic perspective, the law “control[s] 
man’s outward relations with the state and with his fellow man.”11  Ethics, in 
turn, control man’s “inner relations . . . with his Creator.”12  In Warren’s 
view, the two could not “be divorced,” and hence he found it “essential that 
the student should bring to the study of law a mind well grounded and trained 
in the correct science of Ethics.”13  Fordham Law School’s course in legal 
ethics was designed to achieve that end. 
The course in jurisprudence was even more Catholic.  In the Law School’s 
first sixteen years, Father Terence J. Shealy, a Jesuit, taught this course from 
the perspective of Thomistic Scholasticism’s natural law philosophy.14  
According to Kaczorowski, Shealy “assumed the existence of immutable 
metaphysical principles, and he attributed these principles of causation to 
God and the knowledge of these principles to ‘an infallible source,’ the 
Catholic Church.”15 
 
 6. See generally ROBERT J. KACZOROWSKI, FORDHAM UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW:  A 
HISTORY (2012). 
 7. See Sexton, supra note 3, at 921. 
 8. See KACZOROWSKI, supra note 6, at 5 (“Fordham Law School was intended to raise 
Catholic immigrants and their sons into positions of leadership in professional, economic, and 
political life.”). 
 9. Id. at 15 (quoting archival materials). 
 10. See id. at 15–16. 
 11. Id. at 15 (quoting archival materials). 
 12. Id. (quoting archival materials). 
 13. Id. at 15–16 (quoting archival materials). 
 14. Id. at 16–17. 
 15. Id. at 17. 
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Shealy’s successor, Father Francis LeBuffe, another Jesuit, similarly 
rooted his jurisprudence course “in the doctrine of Natural Law and natural 
rights and consequently in an objective, real standard of justice.”16  LeBuffe 
argued that American political theory, as expressed in the Declaration of 
Independence and Constitution, had “evolved from Roman Catholic 
thought.”17  Thirty years after Fordham Law School’s founding, yet another 
Jesuit, Father John Pyne, was still teaching that the rules of human law were 
“based on natural law—moral law.”18  This Roman Catholic perspective on 
law and legal education was generally well received by Fordham students.19 
With the development of legal realism and the coming of the New Deal in 
the 1930s, Fordham’s natural law Thomistic Scholasticism became 
politically important.  Father LeBuffe, for one, published a book on 
jurisprudence in 1938, which he described as “stand[ing] in flat 
contradiction” to the totalitarian philosophy of Nazis and Communists, as 
well as to “the totalitarian philosophy of Justice Holmes and his followers”—
that is, the legal realists.20  In a series of articles published between 1925 and 
1940, another Fordham professor, Walter B. Kennedy, who was “perhaps the 
most widely respected Catholic legal scholar” of his time, similarly defended 
Thomistic jurisprudence and attacked legal realism.21  Meanwhile, the dean 
of the Law School, Ignatius Wilkinson, an opponent of President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt’s New Deal and its reliance on legal realist jurisprudence, gave 
important testimony against the president’s Court-packing scheme.22 
As we know, the legal realist leanings of Oliver Wendell Holmes and of 
Franklin Roosevelt’s appointees to the Supreme Court came to dominate the 
Court and the rest of the American judiciary in the aftermath of the late 
1930s.23  But, for my purposes, legal realism’s victory is not what mattered 
when Fordham was at its pinnacle.  What mattered was that Fordham Law 
School was a leader in the battle against legal realism and the New Deal; its 
leadership role made it not simply a good law school but an important one 
that stood out from the mass of other law schools. 
Most law is dull, and it is boring both for professors to teach it and students 
to learn it.  Discussing whether the rule against perpetuities invalidates a 
particular future interest simply is not exciting.  Law becomes exciting, 
 
 16. Id. at 144 (quoting FRANCIS P. LEBUFFE, OUTLINES OF PURE JURISPRUDENCE i (1924)). 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. at 19 (quoting the revised remarks of Governor Malcolm Wilson at the opening of 
Fordham’s sesquicentennial celebration at the Rose Hill campus on September 30, 1990). 
 19. See id. at 16–17. 
 20. Id. at 145 (quoting FRANCIS P. LEBUFFE & JAMES V. HAYES, THE AMERICAN 
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW WITH CASES TO ILLUSTRATE PRINCIPLES vi (1947)). 
 21. See id. at 146 (quoting EDWARD A. PURCELL JR., THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY:  
SCIENTIFIC NATURALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF VALUE 163–64 (1973)).  See generally Walter 
B. Kennedy, A Review of Legal Realism, 9 FORDHAM L. REV. 362 (1940); Walter B. Kennedy, 
The Scientific Approach in the Law, 70 U.S. L. REV. 75 (1936); Walter B. Kennedy, Utility of 
Legal Philosophy, 3 N.Y. L. REV. 353 (1925). 
 22. See KACZOROWSKI, supra note 6, at 147. 
 23. See William H. Rehnquist, Presidential Appointments to the Supreme Court, 2 CONST. 
COMMENT. 319, 326 (1985). 
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however, when the well-being of the nation or the future of liberty depends 
on what authorities determine the law to be.  Law was exciting for members 
of the Fordham Law School community in the late 1930s because the 
scholarship that faculty members were writing, the testimony they were 
giving, the teaching they were doing, and the material students were learning 
mattered politically.  Students and faculty alike were participants in a 
struggle over the American soul—they believed that the future of the nation, 
of liberty, and indeed of the world depended on their winning that struggle.  
Ultimately, of course, it mattered greatly that the members of the Fordham 
community lost the struggle, but in the midst of the struggle it did not matter 
at all.  Fordham Law professors were players on a national stage, and their 
student audiences were intimately involved in the play.  Students and faculty 
alike shared in the excitement surrounding them, and all were aroused by the 
struggle they were participating in. 
This excitement attracted students to Fordham Law School:  a student 
could go to Fordham and be part of a struggle over the future of the nation, 
or could attend New York University (NYU), St. John’s, or Brooklyn Law 
School and learn about the rule against perpetuities.  As one Fordham student 
had earlier written, “the palpable and almost universal defect in our law 
school system [wa]s the exaggerated technicalization of the law.”24  In most 
law schools, “the reasons of law and government . . . [we]re sacrificed for the 
practical and the technical”—for the rule against perpetuities—thereby 
reducing the profession of law “to a trade, and the presumably scientific 
lawyer a skilful [sic] clerk.”25  The “special feature of the Fordham system,” 
in contrast, was its understanding that “legal training must ever be a question 
of vital public interest.”26 
The role of Fordham in the late-1930s battles over legal realism and the 
New Deal attracted not only students but also public attention.  New Yorkers 
who paid attention to national events understood that the Fordham Law 
School community’s efforts would help determine the course the nation 
would take; Columbia was the only other law school in New York whose 
faculty and alumni were players on the national stage.  That put Fordham 
together with Columbia in the same league as Harvard and Yale, while law 
schools such as NYU, Brooklyn, and St. John’s remained minor-league 
institutions distantly behind Fordham. 
Fordham’s reputation as a major institution lasted for about two decades.27  
The summer after my graduation from college in 1962, I worked as a delivery 
boy for my father’s business.  One day I delivered to a middle-aged Roman 
Catholic customer who had learned, probably from my parents, that I would 
be going to law school in the fall.  Her question was fascinating—“where are 
you going,” she asked, “Fordham or Harvard?”  When I responded that I 
planned to attend NYU as a Root-Tilden Scholar, she did not understand. 
 
 24. KACZOROWSKI, supra note 6, at 18 (quoting a third-year student). 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. See id. at 205. 
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This woman’s knowledge was outdated, as was likely true of the 
knowledge of many people who were not experts.  Nonetheless, her question 
makes the point that, for some time, Fordham was an outstanding law 
school—a law school in competition with Ivy League schools—both in the 
reality of what its faculty and students were striving to accomplish and in 
public perception.  I agree with the student quoted above that Fordham’s 
stature rested on its propagation of a legal ideology—natural law Thomistic 
Scholasticism, which was especially attractive to Roman Catholics like my 
father’s customer—an ideology locked in struggle with the legal realism of 
Columbia Law School and the emerging jurisprudence of Harvard Law 
School. 
In the aftermath of World War II, however, Fordham Law School’s unique 
approach to jurisprudence came to an end.  Professor Walter Kennedy died 
in 1945,28 and Dean Ignatius Wilkinson passed on in 1953;29 they were not 
replaced by like-minded faculty.  The most important change, however, was 
in the required jurisprudence course.  The change occurred in 1962 when 
Father Charles M. Whalen, yet another Jesuit, joined the law school faculty.30 
Kaczorowski notes that it was important to Whalen “and his philosophy of 
legal education that students understand that he was not trying to sell any 
Catholic line in his teaching” but “simply trying to make students aware of 
the big questions in jurisprudence.”31  Accordingly, he stopped wearing 
clerical garb and began to dress as a layman.32  More importantly, he did not 
teach from Father LeBuffe’s jurisprudence text but assigned readings by 
diverse authors such as Walter Lippman, Plato, and Professor Lon Fuller of 
Harvard Law School.33  Whalen also “distributed notes on different versions 
of natural law, cautioning students not to think that natural law meant only 
one thing, the Scholastic version of natural law.”34 
The change in Fordham’s approach to jurisprudence was inevitable in light 
of the larger changes occurring in postwar American culture.  In the 1930s 
Roman Catholics remained a separate and distinct minority in American 
culture with some churchmen striving to proselytize others to accept 
Catholicism’s moral and religious views.35  But World War II transformed 
the place of Catholics.36  Largely as a result of the GI Bill, Catholics began 
to enter mainstream national life, which led to integration into mainstream 
American business, educational, and residential culture.37  Mid-twentieth-
 
 28. Walter Kennedy, A Dean at Fordham, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 1945, at 14. 
 29. 400 Mourn at Mass for Dean Wilkinson, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1953, at 19. 
 30. See KACZOROWSKI, supra note 6, at 150. 
 31. Id. at 151–52. 
 32. Id. at 151. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. See JOHN T. MCGREEVY, CATHOLICISM AND AMERICAN FREEDOM:  A HISTORY 153–
56, 162 (2003) (discussing Catholic leaders’ promotion of barriers to divorce, film censorship, 
and birth control restrictions). 
 36. WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE LEGALIST REFORMATION:  LAW, POLITICS, AND IDEOLOGY IN 
NEW YORK, 1920–1980, at 168–69 (2001). 
 37. See id. at 168–69, 246. 
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century Catholics, unlike many early twentieth-century ones, began to think 
like other Americans and to accept mainstream ideas and values, and the 
church tamped down its belief system to accommodate them.38  The change 
in Fordham Law School’s jurisprudence course merely reflected this larger 
change in the place of Catholics in American society and in the faith of the 
American Catholic Church. 
Meanwhile, the Thomistic Scholasticism of such scholars as Walter 
Kennedy and Ignatius Wilkinson had suffered total political defeat.  Natural-
law and natural-rights thinking no longer served as vehicles for arguing 
against the constitutionality of New Deal initiatives; in cases like Wickard v. 
Filburn,39 the Supreme Court had left no doubt that Congress had 
unconstrained, plenary power to regulate the economy.40  When Republicans 
regained control of Congress in 1946 and retained it in several subsequent 
elections, the Court stopped considering the constitutionality of regulatory 
legislation.41  Opposition to the New Deal and its regulatory legacy instead 
resurfaced in Congress in the form of legislation such as the Taft-Hartley 
Act42 and political movements such as McCarthyism.  Although the Church 
often participated in anti-Communist efforts, its main motive for 
participating was not Thomistic Scholasticism but concern for the well-being 
of Catholics behind the Iron Curtain.43 
At the same time, a new issue of social policy was emerging before the 
Supreme Court.  During and after World War II, African Americans began 
demanding an end to segregation and other forms of racial discrimination.44  
The executive branch took some steps to meet their demands, most notably 
desegregation of the military,45 but Congress, where action was blocked by 
Southern Democratic power on congressional committees and by threats of 
filibusters in the Senate, did nothing.46  By the early 1950s, it was clear that 
the Supreme Court would be the principal institution to determine the 
legitimacy of segregation.47 
The difficulty was that putting an end to segregation and racial 
discrimination was, in essence, a matter of politics and public policy.  The 
 
 38. See MCGREEVY, supra note 35, at 220–21 (discussing the effect of greater Catholic 
integration through an increase in college attendance, movement from urban areas to the 
suburbs, and higher intermarriage rates). 
 39. 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
 40. Id. at 128. 
 41. See David P. Currie, Constitution in the Supreme Court:  The New Deal, 54 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 504, 554–55 (1987). 
 42. See generally Labor Management Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 
(1947) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141–197 (2012)). 
 43. See WILLIAM E. NELSON, FIGHTING FOR THE CITY:  A HISTORY OF THE NEW YORK CITY 
CORPORATION COUNSEL 195–201 (2008). 
 44. See RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE:  THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF 
EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 216–18, 224–27, 238 (2004). 
 45. See id. at 254. 
 46. See ROBERT A. CARO, THE YEARS OF LYNDON JOHNSON:  MASTER OF THE SENATE 78–
105, 212–22, 855–85 (2002). 
 47. See generally Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 
629 (1950). 
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New Deal Court in the late 1930s implicitly declined to decide issues of 
politics and policy, and key members of the Court, led by Justice Felix 
Frankfurter, maintained that the Court could decide only issues of law and 
should abstain from deciding matters of politics.48  Thus the task for legal 
academics who sought to be in dialogue with the Court was to develop a set 
of principles elaborating how the Court could remedy segregation and racial 
discrimination as a matter of law rather than politics.  Thomistic 
Scholasticism had nothing to contribute to this task, and thus Fordham Law 
professors had nothing distinctive to add to the discussion.  Unlike what it 
had been in the 1930s, Fordham Law School simply became one of many 
good law schools training students to be legal technicians.  It was no longer 
a distinctive player on the national jurisprudential stage and, consequently, 
did not radiate the excitement or enjoy the prestige of being on that stage. 
As a 1986 report of an ABA inspection team noted, Fordham Law School 
no longer had a clear mission.49  The report declared it “essential” that the 
Law School “define its mission, derive its objectives and goals from that 
mission, and then determine the policies and actions necessary to carry out 
the mission.”50  The school’s lack of mission was reflected, in turn, in the 
faculty’s scholarship.  Although the faculty wrote “a steady stream of books, 
articles . . . and other legal writing,” it produced essentially descriptive work 
that did “a fine job disseminating legal knowledge,” but did “not advance 
legal knowledge through scholarly inquiry.”51  Even the best of the faculty’s 
scholarship, John D. Calamari’s and Joseph M. Perillo’s treatise, The Law of 
Contracts,52 focused primarily on disseminating legal doctrine rather than 
evaluating it.  Such scholarship, in the words of a subsequent ABA inspection 
report, tended to “detract from a school’s image both external and internal.”53 
What the history of Fordham Law School thus suggests is that a school 
cannot be great unless it strives to advance some unique intellectual agenda.  
From the time of its founding until the 1940s, Fordham’s agenda was to 
proselytize the Roman Catholic Church’s vision of natural law.54  This 
mission made the Law School a unique, exciting rival of Columbia Law 
School that presented a powerful message to both students and outside 
observers.  And, when the Catholic understanding of natural law became a 
political weapon in the hands of opponents of legal realism and the New 
Deal,55 Fordham Law School approached the pinnacle of legal education.  
With the triumph of realism and the New Deal, however, Fordham’s 
prominence faded.  Key faculty died, unique Catholic ideas fell into 
desuetude, and the Jesuit jurisprude charged with proselytizing the Catholic 
 
 48. See KLUGER, supra note 44, at 238–41, 279–81. 
 49. See KACZOROWSKI, supra note 6, at 330–31. 
 50. Id. at 331 (quoting a 1986 site inspection report). 
 51. Id. (quoting a 1986 site inspection report). 
 52. See generally JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 
(1977). 
 53. KACZOROWSKI, supra note 6, at 332 (quoting a 1986 report). 
 54. See supra notes 9–19 and accompanying text. 
 55. See supra notes 20–22 and accompanying text. 
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agenda abandoned the effort.56  Father Whalen’s jurisprudence course 
became merely a survey of jurisprudential options, and with it, Fordham 
became just one more good law school among many others. 
I see a similar trajectory in the history of Harvard Law School.  Of course, 
Harvard has always enjoyed a higher ranking than Fordham.  For most of the 
century prior to about 1970, Harvard was not simply a rival to Columbia Law 
School.  Harvard was the preeminent law school in the United States.  The 
similarity that I see between Fordham and Harvard is that Harvard’s 
preeminence, like the prominence of Fordham, rested significantly on its 
commitment to a unique intellectual mission of national importance.  When 
that mission lost its vitality around 1970, Harvard’s preeminence 
disappeared, and Harvard Law School became merely one of several 
outstanding American schools, although its financial resources and history 
continued to give it a better reputation and higher standing than that enjoyed 
by Fordham. 
Harvard’s rise to preeminence began with the appointment of Christopher 
Columbus Langdell as dean of the Law School in 1870.57  Langdell had a 
mission—to introduce into legal education, first at Harvard and then 
elsewhere, the case method and the Socratic method in lieu of the lecture 
method.58  This mission, on its face, might seem trivial, but it was related to 
a deeper understanding of what Langdell wanted American law to be.  
Langdell envisioned law as a science in which answers to legal questions 
could be discovered through internal analysis of the sources of law, 
especially past judicial precedents.59  Law, according to Langdell, was not 
merely an adjunct of politics, and he did not want legal questions to be 
answered nor legal disputes resolved by determining the answer or resolution 
most consistent with the political values of the current holders of 
governmental power.60  He wanted legal answers and the resolution of 
disputes to be neutral, objective, and independent of the political will of those 
holding power.  “Law, considered as a science,” Langdell wrote, “consist[s] 
of certain principles or doctrines,” the mastery of which so “as to be able to 
apply them with constant . . . facility and . . . certainty . . . [is] what 
constitute[s] a true lawyer.”61  According to Langdell, for a true lawyer, law 
should be distinct from and transcend politics. 
Langdell quickly made his mission of developing an apolitical, scientific 
conception of law—what we today might call a professional conception—
the mission of Harvard Law School.62  That mission, in turn, gave Harvard 
 
 56. See supra notes 28–30 and accompanying text. 
 57. See Martha Minow, Marking 200 Years of Legal Education:  Traditions of Change, 
Reasoned Debate, and Finding Differences and Commonalities, 130 HARV. L. REV. 2279, 
2282–83 (2017). 
 58. See id. at 2283. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 2284. 
 61. WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE ROOTS OF AMERICAN BUREAUCRACY, 1830–1900, at 84 
(1982) (alterations in original) (quoting C. C. LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW 
OF CONTRACTS vi (1871)). 
 62. See Minow, supra note 57, at 2284. 
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national prominence.63  Nearly forty years ago I wrote that American thinkers 
were growing disenchanted with the course of American politics and 
lawmaking in the aftermath of the Civil War.64  American freedoms seemed 
threatened as political majorities in Congress rode roughshod over the 
presidency, the Supreme Court, southern state governments, and political 
opponents in general.65  Reformers saw a need for “new standard[s]” that, in 
the words of E. L. Godkin, would “place men’s relations in society where 
they never yet ha[d] been placed, under the control of trained human 
reason.”66  Langdell’s introduction of the Socratic case method into Harvard 
Law School provided reform thinkers with precisely what they were seeking 
in the vital field of law—an ideology that understood law as a product of 
trained human reason rather than the political will of those who happened to 
be in power.  It tied law to its established past rather than to some new 
political future.  To overstate, Langdell’s vision of law as a science reset the 
path of the law from one of radical, majoritarian, and egalitarian reform by 
Congress to the conservative path of the rule of law—from the radical 
Reconstruction dream of equality for all people, black as well as white, to 
law’s protection of the status quo and, with it, support for the wealth and 
power of established elites.  It is no wonder that Langdell’s vision of law 
spread throughout American legal education between 1870 and the early 
twentieth century and made Harvard the preeminent law school in America. 
Harvard Law School remained the model for professional, scientific 
analysis of the law well into the second half of the twentieth century.  
Although the model was intrinsically a conservative one, it often produced 
moderately progressive scholarship in the hands of faculty members who 
pursued it.  James Bradley Thayer was one such faculty scholar; he, more 
than anyone else, developed the argument that the Supreme Court should 
normally defer to the political process and deploy its power of judicial review 
sparingly by striking down only legislation that unambiguously violates 
explicit constitutional norms.67  Zechariah Chafee wrote powerfully in 
support of freedom of speech, especially the free speech rights of political 
dissidents caught up in the Red Scare of the early 1920s.68  An important 
progressive member of the faculty, Felix Frankfurter, wrote and litigated on 
behalf of immigrants and labor unions and later became a key advisor to the 
New Deal, while always preserving his commitment to professionalism and 
the rule of law.69  The most noted opponent of the Supreme Court’s 
conservative, laissez-faire jurisprudence in the 1910s and 1920s, however, 
was the dean of Harvard Law School, Roscoe Pound.  I have always found 
Pound’s writings superficial because it has never been clear to me whether 
 
 63. Id. at 2283. 
 64. See generally NELSON, supra note 61. 
 65. See id. at 72–81. 
 66. Id. at 82. 
 67. See James Bradley Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of 
Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 155–56 (1893). 
 68. See generally ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., FREEDOM OF SPEECH (1920). 
 69. See H. N. HIRSCH, THE ENIGMA OF FELIX FRANKFURTER 67–78, 90–94, 99–124 (1981). 
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his criticism of the Court was that the Court was too conservative or that it 
was behaving too politically.  But many took Pound seriously in the 1910s 
and 1920s, perhaps because his jurisprudence was viewed as both 
progressive and at the same time supportive of professionalism and the rule 
of law.70 
Two noteworthy Harvard graduates on the Supreme Court, Justices Oliver 
Wendell Holmes and Louis D. Brandeis, further exemplified the Harvard 
position.  Both were outstanding lawyers.  Brandeis, in particular, paid 
detailed attention to legal doctrine and careful legal argument, while Holmes 
had written what remains one of America’s great legal studies.71  At the same 
time, both justices typically voted in support of progressive causes, ranging 
from freedom of speech72 to upholding redistributive regulatory legislation.73  
As a result of the work and standing of the Harvard justices and the Harvard 
faculty, it was clear by the early 1930s that Harvard Law School was the 
preeminent professional law school in the United States, simultaneously 
supporting progressive causes within the constraints of the rule of law. 
Harvard Law School’s last great intellectual effort was the propagation of 
legal process jurisprudence.  Legal process should be understood as a 
successor to Harvard’s longstanding support of progressive causes within the 
confines of the rule of law.  The great scholar of legal process was, of course, 
Harvard professor Henry M. Hart, who initially worked alone and, later, 
worked with Albert M. Sacks. 
Hart began his legal process work when he started teaching Harvard Law 
School’s legislation course in the late 1930s.74  By no later than 1940 he had 
entered into a joint enterprise with Abe Feller, an instructor at Yale, and 
Walter Gellhorn, at Columbia, and by the academic year 1941–42, they had 
produced a mimeographed edition of materials on legislation.75  World War 
II interrupted Hart’s work, but when he returned to Harvard for the academic 
year 1946–47, he continued to develop materials for his legislation course.76  
Sacks joined him in 1952–53, and by 1958 they had produced the tentative 
and final mimeographed edition of materials, entitled The Legal Process:  
Basic Problems in the Making and Application of Law (“The Legal 
Process”).77 
The dates are important because they reveal a great deal about legal 
process theory.  Although the 1958 edition of The Legal Process focused 
 
 70. DAVID WIGDOR, ROSCOE POUND:  PHILOSOPHER OF LAW 181–254 (1974). 
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mainly on private law, its goal was to articulate a theory of public law.78  
There were two principal public law issues during the decade between 1946 
and 1958, when The Legal Process was in gestation:  (1) a series of Supreme 
Court cases beginning with Dennis v. United States79 in 1951 and 
culminating in Yates v. United States80 in 1957, in which the Court addressed 
the issue of freedom of speech for Communists and other radical dissidents; 
and (2) the issue of segregation and racial discrimination, exemplified by the 
1954 case of Brown v. Board of Education.81 
Another seed of legal process theory was a “Legal Philosophy Discussion 
Group” that met at Harvard Law School during the 1956–57 academic year.82  
In addition to Hart and Sacks, Lon Fuller, Paul Freund, and three important 
visiting professors—H. L. A. Hart, Julius Stone, and Herbert Wechsler—
participated in the group.83  The topic for the year was “Administrative and 
Judicial Discretion.”84  All the participants agreed that discretion was an 
essential element of all legal decision-making, but they also agreed that 
discretion had to be controlled by institutional structures and practices, 
procedural safeguards, and what Hart called a requirement of “reasoned 
elaboration.”85  Discretion was essential if society was to enjoy progress, but 
discretion had to be subjected to professional control in order to preserve the 
rule of law and individual freedom.86 
Thus, legal process theory, like the jurisprudence of Harvard Law School 
since Louis D. Brandeis, Oliver Wendell Holmes, and James Bradley Thayer, 
sought to maintain a balance between progressive aspirations and the 
maintenance of professionalism and the rule of law.  To quote Professors 
Eskridge and Frickey, the editors of the published version of the Hart and 
Sacks The Legal Process materials, it was an effort on the part of 
“comfortable law professors [who were] preparing their students to run the 
country” to bring about “incremental change through duly established 
procedures, with a libertarian rather than egalitarian view of Brown, and with 
principles that were neutral and reasoning that was universal.”87  In this form, 
legal process theory was responsive to demands of dissidents for free speech; 
it readily explained and justified the transformation of constitutional doctrine 
that occurred between the Dennis and Yates cases.  Individual rights and 
societal progress were not in tension in the free speech cases.  In dealing with 
free speech, legal process jurisprudence was thereby able to reflect a 
culmination of Harvard Law School’s thinking since the turn of the twentieth 
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century about progressive reform within the rule of law on behalf of white 
men. 
Legal process theory was more problematic, however, in the context of 
race.  Professors Eskridge and Frickey note that both Hart and Sacks were 
strong supporters of efforts to end segregation and racial discrimination.88  
Most other legal process theorists also defended the Brown decision.  The 
most notable defense was that of Alexander M. Bickel, a student of Hart and 
a law clerk for Justice Frankfurter,89 who published “The Original 
Understanding and the Segregation Decision,”90 which was based on a bench 
memo he wrote for the Justice.91  The article found the Fourteenth 
Amendment sufficiently capacious to allow for the Court’s decision in 
Brown,92 but, as I read it, did not establish that the Amendment compelled 
Brown’s result.  Although several noteworthy articles93 did argue that Brown 
was not only permissible but also right, I have never understood that their 
defense rested on legal process grounds. 
Legal process theory simply conflicted with the aspirations for racial 
equality as those aspirations developed during the 1960s.  Legal process, as 
I understand it, contemplated the gradual assimilation of African Americans 
into an established, unchanging legal and social order, just as Catholic and 
Jewish immigrants were being assimilated.  According to Professors 
Eskridge and Frickey, Hart and Sacks, by insisting that “change” could be 
“accomplished only through . . . ‘duly established’ institutions and 
mechanisms,” acquiesced “in the political status quo”;94 they envisioned 
African Americans slowly assimilating into a culture that would remain 
unchanged.  Their insistence, however, “was discordant with the experiences 
of many . . . people of color” for whom “‘duly established mechanisms of 
change’ were neither responsive nor even tolerant.”95  Martin Luther King, 
Jr., for one, vociferously demanded immediate, not gradual, equality.  To the 
suggestion that blacks wait, King responded: 
“Wait” has almost always meant “Never.” . . . 
We have waited for more than 340 years for our constitutional and 
God-given rights. . . .  [W]hen you see the vast majority of your twenty 
million Negro brothers smothering in an airtight cage of poverty in the 
midst of an affluent society; when you suddenly find your tongue twisted 
and your speech stammering as you seek to explain to your six-year-old 
daughter why she can’t go to the public amusement park that has just been 
advertised on television, . . . and see ominous clouds of inferiority 
beginning to form in her little mental sky, and see her beginning to distort 
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her personality by developing an unconscious bitterness toward white 
people; . . . when you are harried by day and haunted by night by the fact 
that you are a Negro, living constantly at tiptoe stance, never quite knowing 
what to expect next, and are plagued with inner fears and outer 
resentments; . . . then you will understand why we find it difficult to wait.96 
Legal process theory failed to adequately respond not only to the demands 
of African Americans but also to the next group of political dissidents—
young opponents of the Vietnam War.97  Duly established institutions were 
neither responsive nor tolerant when students in the late 1960s made clear 
that they were unwilling to die in Vietnam for what they saw as a lie.  One 
of my first-year law students at Harvard Law School in those years was a 
young second lieutenant who had just returned from Vietnam.  I eagerly 
asked him to tell me what he knew about the war so that I could better counsel 
other young men who sought my advice on whether to accept the draft, to 
refuse to report for induction, or to flee to Canada.  But he would not tell me 
what he knew. 
His refusal to impart his knowledge made it impossible for me, in many 
respects a legal process acolyte who hoped that reasoned analysis could help 
solve the crisis that other young men faced, to speak effectively to those 
young men.  I have always assumed that his knowledge also made it 
impossible for him to accept the reasoned elaboration of Professors Hart and 
Sacks in his second and third years at Harvard Law School.  “Sometimes, 
sometimes,” as even Hart knew, “you just have to do the right thing”98 and 
not engage in wrong things, and reasoned elaboration did not help decide 
what was right. 
Yet another failure of legal process theory, this time in the early 1970s, 
occurred in response to feminism.  Women demanded equality, one element 
of which was the power to control their own bodies and choose whether and 
when to bear a child.  Roe v. Wade99 gave women that power, but not in 
accordance with legal process precepts.  Roe was not a legal process opinion; 
it reflected activist, political decision-making even on the part of three of the 
four justices that President Richard Nixon had appointed to the Court to limit 
the Court’s activist tendencies.  Legal process theory and full gender equality 
were simply at odds; courts adhering to legal process concepts could not give 
women the full equality they sought when the political process was not 
prepared to confer it. 
Meanwhile, the judicial inspiration of legal process, Justice Frankfurter, 
suffered a stroke and was forced to retire in 1962; he died in 1965.100  In 
1971, the last true legal process acolyte on the Supreme Court, the younger 
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John Marshall Harlan, left the Court and died shortly thereafter.101  The two 
academic leaders of legal process, Hart and Sacks, passed off the scholarly 
scene about the same time:  Hart died in 1969,102 and Sacks moved into 
administration as dean of Harvard Law School in 1971.103  Alexander M. 
Bickel,104 another leading legal process thinker, died in 1974.105 
Moreover, for activists and student sympathizers in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s—young people committed to “doing the right thing” without 
delay—legal process theory offered no help.106  They needed something 
different.  In response to that need, African American and feminist scholars 
developed over the course of the next decades two new categories of 
scholarship—what we now know as critical race theory107 and feminist 
jurisprudence.108  At the same time, the critical legal studies (CLS) 
movement, led by young Harvard Law School faculty members together with 
faculty from other law schools, sought to articulate a more comprehensive 
jurisprudential alternative to legal process by understanding law as simply a 
form of politics.  In the words of Joseph Singer, a CLS scholar and now a 
faculty member at Harvard Law School, legal principles are “fundamentally 
contradictory.”109  It follows that: 
Since every legal decision reverts to the fundamental contradiction, we 
have no alternative but to decide each case in the light of competing goals 
and interests.  To make these decisions, nothing can aid us except the same 
moral and political arguments we use in other areas of ethical discourse.  It 
is an illusion to think that legal reasoning is any less political and subjective 
than the reasoning used by legislators, voters and other political actors.110 
It is difficult to imagine a more clear-cut abandonment of Harvard Law 
School’s century-long commitment to professionalism, which began with 
Langdell, continued through Frankfurter, and ended with legal process theory 
that developed in detail the need to focus on institutional structures, 
procedural safeguards, and reasoned elaboration as the foundations of 
professionalism. 
I was one of many outsiders who worried in a 1988 article that CLS’s turn 
to politics and abandonment of professional traditions and standards would 
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“undermine law rather than use it to better society.”111  I expressed my “fear” 
of “government in accordance with the naked political preferences of . . . [a 
Middle America] majority” and could “think of no way to restrain this 
majority other than by appeals to law.”112  I therefore urged “legal 
scholars . . . to strengthen the capacity of law to restrain tyranny by building 
as much objective and determinate content into it as possible”113 rather than 
focus on law’s fundamental contradictions.  Now, during the presidency of 
Donald Trump, I value professionalism and objectivity in law even more as, 
possibly, the last defense against arbitrary tyranny. 
What is clear to me in retrospect is that an old guard of the Harvard faculty 
in the 1970s and 1980s had concerns similar to those I have just expressed.  
They fought the young CLS faculty to preserve professional norms and 
standards.114  The result was two decades of civil war at Harvard Law School 
as CLS faculty argued for a purely political vision of law and the legal 
system, in the process undermining faith in professional norms, while the old 
guard strove to uphold those professional traditions.  In the end, the old guard 
failed, with the result that today’s Harvard Law School no longer adheres to 
a special, unwavering mission of professionalism.  The effort of the CLS 
movement to give Harvard a new politically progressive mission also failed, 
although the movement generally helped politicize law.  Thus, Harvard Law 
School has been left with no clear mission, which has pushed it, like Fordham 
before, into a period of decline.  Harvard’s resources and traditions continue 
to make it a great law school, but it is no longer the preeminent law school in 
the United States. 
What I have said points me toward some vague speculations with which I 
would like to end.  Fordham Law School and Harvard Law School both 
attained their greatest eminence when they propagated a set of norms, 
religious in the one case and professional in the other, which were capable of 
constraining untrammeled power on the part of political actors.  But neither 
religion nor professionalism today possess the power of constraint they once 
enjoyed.  Other sources of constraint are needed. 
I want to speculate that Yale Law School in the 1980s succeeded Harvard 
in preeminence by looking to other disciplines, especially economics, 
history, political science, and philosophy, for sources of constraint.  In the 
late 1990s, NYU Law School turned to globalism—to an understanding that, 
as America loses its hegemony and becomes merely one part of the larger 
world, deep forces of that larger world will provide lawyers with a foundation 
to preserve law as a constraint on the exercise of power by political leaders.  
These are optimistic aspirations.  Much more pessimistic are the ambitions 
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of Presidents Putin, Trump, and Xi, that rulers will deploy power with no 
constraints whatsoever. 
APPENDIX:  TRANSCRIPT* 
PROFESSOR ROBIN WEST:  So two thoughts.  First, I think that the 
view of politics you’re describing is very, very dark.  Politics itself is a 
constraint on power in a well-functioning polity as well as the most important 
vehicle for exercising power in good ways.  So the vilification in ordinary 
legal discourse of politics and the exercise of power and also in critical legal 
discourse is, I think, alarming and unfortunate. 
PROFESSOR WILLIAM NELSON:  Can I respond to that before you get 
to your second?  I’m actually an optimist about politics.  My concern is that 
sometimes it goes bad, and, when it does, a lot of bad things can happen.  
James Bradley Thayer seems to me to have the answer in saying courts 
should not interfere in politics except in very clear cases.115  Frankfurter 
agreed and kept saying courts shouldn’t do things; the political process 
should do them.116  The political process needs to be encouraged and made 
capable, and when courts interfere, they diminish its capability. 
PROFESSOR WEST:  I’m with you entirely on that.  My limited point is 
that there was an awful lot of shared ground between the old-guard liberals 
and the CLS people about the alignment of politics with power and law with 
reason.  The Crits never really problematized the basic moral distinction 
between power, bad politics, bad law, and good reason.  If you can show that 
law is really more like politics, then you’ve shown something important and 
sort of malignant about law itself.  But the Crits never did it, and I fault them 
for that. 
Now my second thought.  In the first part of your paper you described a 
distinction between the ordinary mission of ordinary law schools and an 
exalted mission of a law school that identifies a higher purpose for law and 
for itself.117  The rule against perpetuities, the holder in due course doctrine, 
all of that I think has a lot of nobility to it and it is part of the mission of the 
ordinary law school to convey that nobility.  So I resist the idea that what 
legal scholarship should be doing is exploring an exalted mission that will 
identify its law school with something higher than ordinary law.  You don’t 
want to be just producing technicians but, on the other hand, let’s not 
denigrate technicians. 
PROFESSOR NELSON:  Much of my take comes from teaching property 
for thirty years or so.  There is a nobility to a lot of property law.  But that 
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nobility is overwhelmingly about preserving the status quo, and preserving 
the status quo is overwhelmingly about making sure that the rich stay rich.  
We can talk about efforts by judges to do some redistribution, such as the 
Mount Laurel118 case in New Jersey, but the judiciary’s success has been 
very limited because of institutional and procedural limitations on what 
judges are able to do. 
JUDGE GUIDO CALABRESI:  I have quite a few different things to say.  
First, on four different possible roles of scholarship.  One is to present a 
particular point of view, moral, ethical, for what society should be.  And that 
is what scholarship should be about.  Which is how you described Fordham.  
The second is for scholars to look in particular areas and create new 
paradigms, new ways of looking at it all together.  The third is simply to take 
an area and move it forward, adjusted to the needs of the day.  And the fourth 
is simply synthesis, putting it all together clearly. 
To go back to Fordham.  I don’t think you can understand Fordham’s 
position in the 1930s and its later decline apart from the position of 
Catholicism—seen as an immigrant religion of foreigners who were 
considered inferior to the rest.  I know that because as an Italian Catholic 
arriving here I had very little contact with American Catholicism because I 
came from a place where Catholicism was dominant, where intellectual 
Catholics were constantly disagreeing.  It was not until I went to Oxford that 
I found as snobbish a view of Catholicism as had been mine.  Now this is 
important because without it, one cannot understand some of the things going 
on in the abortion debate.  I’m talking about the unfortunate opinion by 
Blackmun which says a fetus is not a person for purposes of our 
Constitution119—the white Anglo-Saxon Protestant Constitution, not your 
Constitution, not southern rebel, not Catholic immigrant.  Once I was in a 
taxi with Bill Buckley and the leading pro-life bishop of southern Illinois.  I 
asked them to suppose the result had been the same but that the opinion had 
been:  “There are life values here, and they’re there, and there are equality 
values, and they’re there.  In the technology of today we cannot do both, and 
we decide for equality over life.”  What would your reaction have been?  Both 
of them in one voice said we would not have liked the result but we could 
have lived with it.  But it’s too late to put the genie back in the bottle and stop 
the return to an attitude toward Catholicism as separate, different, foreign, 
and ultimately excluded from the American mainstream. 
Now to Harvard.  I think what you say is right, but I think you mark the 
end too late.  Now, I say that because the last great flowers of legal process 
moved from Harvard to Yale with Bickel and Wellington and there they ran 
into the “law and . . .” movement and the last great flowers of legal realism.  
The combination forced them to look more broadly, the way Bickel and 
Wellington did, and various new paradigms came out of Yale, starting with 
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the great appointments by Rostow in the fifties.  Yeah, it wasn’t until the 
seventies that people kind of looked back and saw how Harvard had lost its 
preeminence.  But I think you have to date it earlier because legal process did 
not come to terms at Harvard until much later with legal realism, call it CLS, 
and “law and . . . .”  When I visited Harvard in 1970, what I was saying in 
law and economics was absolutely new, but nobody there was even aware of 
it except Frank Michelman. 
PROFESSOR KENNETH MACK:  I’d like to offer a different definition 
of what makes a law school prominent and what we might define as decline.  
You say the last great intellectual effort of Harvard Law School was legal 
process; no, it was critical legal studies.  The four big ideas about law since 
1970 are law and economics, originalism, feminist legal theory, and critical 
theory.  And the reason we put critical theory in it would be in part because 
of critical legal studies but also in part because of critical race theory.  Critical 
race theory is gargantuan at the moment; it is taught everywhere—often 
outside law schools. 
So where did critical race theory come from?  It was invented in part by 
three people at Harvard—Derrick Bell on the faculty and two students, 
Kimberlé Crenshaw and Patricia Williams.120  Crenshaw and Williams were 
part of a critical mass of fifty to seventy-five black students in each class.  
Many of them reacted negatively to the old guard and tried to figure out:  
What did law mean for them?  Critical race theory was inspired in part by 
impatience, criticism, and difficulty.  They eventually wrote about it and 
invented something called critical race theory.  I was at Harvard with a 
second group of future critical race theorists.  It was great.  We argued about 
what law was.  We argued about what race was.  We argued about what the 
relationship between race and power was. 
Now, when I reconstruct the history of Harvard Law School, all these 
people were produced by an atmosphere in which people were fighting.  They 
joined the fight, and they invented something new.  Critical legal studies is 
dead but critical race theory is everywhere, and it’s because of the process I 
just described. 
JUDGE CALABRESI:  One thing about that.  In the 1970s and 1980s, the 
same thing was not going on in New Haven.  The difference is that what has 
been described as a disadvantage of Harvard because of size becomes an 
enormous advantage.  Yale had fifteen to twenty African Americans in a 
class, and that’s a large number in that class but it’s still minuscule.  At 
Harvard, because of its size, you have a group which is enormous, and the 
fact of size makes all the difference.  The place has to be open to it, as it was, 
but it gives a tremendous advantage to Harvard and there is no doubt that 
Harvard and Harvard graduates have taken advantage of it to the good of the 
nation. 
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PROFESSOR MACK:  One other addendum.  I’m sort of the inventor of 
the story, but it’s true.  Barack Obama was there in the late 1980s.  We were 
classmates, and he’s in the middle of all this and basically he’s figuring out 
who he is as a public person in the midst of all the contestation.  It’s the first 
place that he really gets validated that he’s going to be somebody important 
in American life.  And it’s because he is in the middle of this contestation 
that he’s got to figure out where he fits in—or doesn’t fit. 
JUDGE CALABRESI:  When you’re talking white, Anglo-Saxon 
Protestants, even Irish today, if there’s a few more from Harvard, there’s 
some from Yale, it really doesn’t matter.  But when you’re talking about the 
degree of diversity that is accomplished in society, then the size of the place 
is what makes it from my point of view still dominant. 
PRESIDENT EMERITUS JOHN SEXTON:  I’m very nervous when we 
begin to make a uniqueness or deep mission an important element in a law 
school’s success. 
PROFESSOR NELSON:  I agree with much of what Guido, Ken, and John 
have said.  As to my dating, it is clear from the perspective of today that 
Yale’s faculty was doing more interesting scholarship than Harvard’s in the 
1960s.  But from the perspective of 1965, the Harvard faculty of James 
Casner, Archibald Cox, Mark De Wolfe Howe, Paul Freund, Lon Fuller, 
Henry Hart, Louis Jaffe, Ben Kaplan, Louis Loss, Al Sacks, and others 
looked mighty preeminent in comparison with the handful of young people 
at Yale who had not yet done most of their major work. 
As to critical race theory, I’m a fan.  Feminist theory as well.  But they’re 
different from critical legal studies.  CLS is based on a concept of a 
fundamental contradiction that renders all law political and, as I said in my 
1988 debate with Bob Gordon,121 thereby undermines the capacity of good 
law to trump bad politics.  I’ve always understood that, since the colonial 
period, American law has not been contradictory but has been driven by 
commitments to individual liberty and community self-rule and that those 
commitments will trump bad politics.  Thus, I disagree with the Crits.  
Equality for women and minorities, in contrast, entered the picture in the 
mid-nineteenth century and has been in conflict with liberty and local self-
rule ever since.  There is a fundamental contradiction here, and feminist 
theory and critical race theory are both striving to resolve the contradiction 
in favor of equality.  They have gone beyond CLS in addressing a real 
contradiction, and I’m with them. 
I need to note, however, that both were minority positions at Harvard after 
1970, and thus neither became the mission of the Law School in the fashion 
that professionalism had been the sole mission from 1870 to 1970.  Like John, 
I become nervous when a school adopts a single, unique, unitary mission, but 
I believe I am correct historically in recognizing that both Fordham and 
Harvard did so and gained special prominence as a result. 
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